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1. In  2005,  French  bankruptcy  was  amended  by the  law regarding  the 
Safeguarding of Businesses (the “Reform of 2005”).1  This Reform has 
amended  Book  VI  of  the  French  Commercial  Code,  entitled 
“Businesses  in  Difficulty.”   The  new  law  also  affects  enforcement 
procedures in a most interesting way.  But before describing the impact 
on the enforcement process, garnishment in particular, let me give you 
the main objective of the Reform of 2005.
2. One  of  the  key  features  of  the  Reform  is  the  creation  of  a  novel 
category in bankruptcy proceedings that entails the suspension of action 
by  an  individual  creditor  to  the  benefit  of  a  debtor  who  is  not  yet 
insolvent  –  and  this  is  what  is  so different  from other  categories  of 
French bankruptcy proceedings.  The debtor needs only to demonstrate 
financial difficulties that may lead to insolvency.2  In other words, the 
debtor needs to “meet current liabilities with its (immediately) available  
assets” to benefit from the new safeguarding proceeding.  The idea is to 
* The author would like to thank Ms. Ann Richter, Geneva, Switzerland who edited his English.  All English 
translations are unofficial by the author.
1 Law no 2005-645 regarding the Safeguarding of Businesses (hereafter “Reform of 2005”), enacted on July 26, 
2005, Official Journal July 27, 2006, p. 12187, partly available online in English on http://legifrance.gouv.fr.  On 
this law, see in the English language: Georges Cavalier, Improvement of Bankruptcy Proceedings in France: The 
Right Step Towards Investors, in THE CHALLENGES OF INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21 ST CENTURY, Schulthess, p. 
533  (2006);  L.  Gaillot,  Sweeping  Reform  for  French  Bankruptcy  Law  (2006),  available  online  on  the 
International Insolvency Institute website (www.iiiglobal.org).
2 Art. L. 620-1 institutes  a safeguarding procedure to be commenced on the petition of the debtor that shows 




create  an  early-warning  mechanism  that  would  prevent  ailing 
enterprises from becoming insolvent.
3. But along with this, which aims to restructure the debtor at  an early 
stage, the Reform of 2005 also aims to render bankruptcy proceedings 
more “creditor friendly.”  The old procedure was indeed too “socially  
oriented”  towards  restructuring  the  debtor  and  maintaining 
employment, rather than satisfying creditors.  The reason for this shift 
in  approach  is  to  encourage  creditors  to  participate  in  court-driven 
safeguarding proceedings.  Among the creditor friendly provisions are 
claims  that  accrued prior  to  the bankruptcy judgment  and for  which 
creditors  omitted  to  file  a  petition  in  due time;  these  claims  will  no 
longer be extinguished.  Also, creditors may no longer be held liable for 
abusive support,3 that  is to say,  a creditor  shall  not be liable  for the 
losses caused as a result of the credits extended.4
4. Therefore, in this  creditor friendly environment, one may be surprised 
by a provision of article L. 632-2 of the Commercial Code, which reads 
in  paragraph 2 (also taken from the Reform of 2005):
3 Many other  examples  can  be  found.   For  instance,  during  the  conciliation  procedure  aiming to  reach  an 
amicable agreement between a non-insolvent debtor and its creditors, new article L. 611-11 of the Commercial 
Code extends the scope of the first-rank priority payment to creditors granting credit or a payment delay to the 
debtor  (the so called “new money privilege”).   Art.  L.  611-11 reads as  follow: “If  safeguard proceedings,  
reorganization proceedings or liquidation proceedings as a result are commenced, those persons who, under the  
approved agreement referred to under Article L611-8(II), have made a contribution of fresh funds to the debtor  
in order to ensure the continuation and long-term future of the business's activity will be paid, up to the amount  
of  this  sum,  according to  their  preferential  lien  before all  other  claims prior  to  the commencement  of  the  
composition proceedings, according to the rank fixed under Article L622-17(II) and Article L641-13(II). Under  
the same conditions, those persons who, in the approved agreement, supply new assets or services in order to  
ensure the continuation and long-term future of the business will be paid, for the amount of the price of the  
assets or services, according to their preferential lien before all claims born prior to the commencement of the  
composition proceedings.”  Also, the constitution of creditors’ committees and the designation of controllers 
give a more active role for the creditors in the drawing up and adoption of safeguard or rescue plans (e.g., art. 
L. 626-30 and L. 621-11 of the Commercial Code).
4 Under art. L. 650-1 of the Commercial Code, “Creditors may not be held liable for harm in relation to credits  
granted, except in cases of fraud, indisputable interference in the management of the debtor or if the guarantees  




“Any notice issued by the Treasury to a third party holding property,5 any 
garnishment or any opposition6 shall also be voidable when it was delivered  
or carried out by a creditor after the date of cessation of payments and in 
knowledge thereof.7”
5. This provision is the stumbling block of two different approaches: one 
taken by the bankruptcy law, and the other taken by the enforcement 
law.  To understand how this apparently conflicting viewpoint is solved 
in the foreground (II), one must first grasp the background (I).
I BACKGROUND
6. The setting of article L. 632-2 §2 is composed of a landscape – the so-
called  suspect  period  (A),  the  panorama  of  which  is  affected  by an 
enforcement process (B).
A Suspect Period
7. What  is  the  suspect  period?   The  suspect  period,  relevant  to  article 
L. 632-2, is the period between the date when the court considers the 
enterprise insolvent (hereafter  the date of  cessation of payments) and 
the date of entering into effect of said court decision.8  In short, it is the 
period between “functional” insolvency and “declared” insolvency.9
8. Let’s take, for example, a bankruptcy proceeding that was opened, let’s 
say,  on  February  29,  2008  against  Ms.  X,  who  owns  a  garment 
business.  In the court decision, the date of cessation of payments was 
5 It is a notice constituting an enforceable instrument, which is issued to third party holding property claimed by 
the Treasury.  For instance, if a taxpayer does not pay its taxes, it is possible for the Treasury to size its funds 
directly over its banking account (the third party will be the banker).
6 The “opposition” is usually defined as a motion to set aside, which is the only appeal available to those parties 
against whom a default judgment has been passed: art. 571 of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
“The motion to set aside aims at retracting a judgement rendered by default.”  However, in the context of art. L. 
632-2, the term “opposition” does not probably have this meaning (see M. JEANTIN, P. LE CANU, DROIT COMMERCIAL  
– ENTREPRISES EN DIFFICULTÉ, Précis Dalloz, 7th ed. (2007), no 616).  It targets other types of “opposition” such as, 
for instance, the opposition from the seller’s creditors of a going-concern to the payment of the price (art. L. 
141-14, Commercial Code, provides: “Within ten days of the date of the second publication referred to in Article  
L. 141-12, any creditor of the previous owner, whether his debt is due or not, may lodge an appeal against the  
payment of the price at the elected domicile via a simple extrajudicial document”).  See generally, J.-P. Arrighi, 
Les nouveaux cas de nullité de la période suspecte, Gaz. Pal. Oct. 9-10, 2005, p. 2990 (no 36 seq.)
7 Unofficial English translation of: “Tout avis à tiers détenteur, toute saisie attribution ou toute opposition peut  
également  être annulée lorsqu’il a été délivré ou pratiqué par un créancier  après la date de cessation des  
paiements et en connaissance de celle-ci.”
8 Commercial Code, art. L. 631-8 §1: “The court shall determine the date of the cessation of payments.  If a date  
is not determined, the date of cessation of payments shall be declared that of the date of the court’s decision.”




said  to  be  November  19,  2007.   Indeed,  the  date  of  cessation  of 
payments was obviously prior to the court’s decision fixing the date, as 
there was no prior official publication of any date.  The period between 
the date of cessation of payments (November 19, 2007) up to the date of 
the court’s decision (February 29, 2008) is characterized as “suspect.” 
The debtor, who still has control over assets, but who is also aware of 
the incapacity to pay debts, may use this period to squander all or part 
of the assets, or to favor one creditor over another.
9. This is the reason why article L. 632-2 paragraph 2 makes it possible to 
invalidate certain actions such as garnishment that may have occurred 
during the suspect period.  Therefore, the further we go back in time, 
the greater the number of enforcement decisions that could potentially 
be invalidated.  To limit legal uncertainty, the court cannot set the date 
of  cessation  of  payments  earlier  than 18 months  prior  to the court’s 
decision.10  In the example of Ms. X, the date of cessation of payments 
could not  have been set  before August  29,  2006, that  is,  18 months 
earlier than February 29, 2008.
10. Therefore,  while  favoring  creditors,  the  new  law  Safeguarding  of  
Businesses deprives  other  creditors  of  their  legal  rights,  for example 
those benefiting from a garnishment granted prior to the opening of the 
procedure.   Thus,  a  creditor  entitled  to  garnishment  may  see  the 
enforcement  action invalidated because of the subsequent opening of 
bankruptcy  proceedings.11  But  what,  precisely,  is  garnishment? 
Garnishment is the process directing a person (garnishee) to hold on to 
the  funds  owed  to  someone  who  is  in  debt  to  another  person 
(garnishor).  For instance, I, the creditor, sold fifty pairs of jeans to Ms. 
10 Commercial Code, art. 631-8 §2 which provides: “The date of the cessation of payments may be moved once  
or more times, without however going back more than eighteen months before the date of issuance of the order  
recognizing the cessation of payments.”
11 This situation has to be distinguished from the more common and general situation where the opening of 
bankruptcy proceedings brings about the stay of individual  enforcement.   Indeed,  in the Suspect  Period, the 
bankruptcy proceeding is not yet formally opened, and under French law applicable prior to the 2005 Reform, an 
already  effectuated  garnishment  was  not  affected  by  a  subsequent  bankruptcy  proceeding  (for  an  example 
relating to a notice issued by the Treasury to third party holding property: Cass. com. June 16, 1998, D. 1998, 
p. 216).  See also K. D. Kerameus, Civil Procedure, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Martinus 




X.  She did not pay,  and has no intention of paying me.  I therefore 
deliver a garnishment; I send a notice to Ms. X’s bank, requesting the 
bank to transfer ownership of Ms. X’s account for the total amount of 
her  debt  to  me.   So  garnishment  is,  in  fact,  a  type  of  enforcement 
procedure.  Now let’s move on to the French enforcement process.
B. Enforcement Process
11. First, French law on civil enforcement dates back to 1991.12  In general, 
the  law  provides  that  enforcement  does  not  belong  to  the  court  of 
original jurisdiction, but rather to the Judge of Execution.13  As a matter 
of principle,14 although no special authorization is required to enforce 
proceedings, the Judge of Execution will often be seized to rule on the 
difficulties relating to enforceable instruments and the arising dispute.
12. Second,  creditors  have  the  choice  of  measures  to  secure  the 
enforcement of their claim.15  Garnishment is one of the two main types 
of  enforcement  on  movables.   French law differentiates  garnishment 
(saisie-attribution),16 from levy on  corporeal  movable  things  (saisie-
vente).17  There are the two main types of enforcement on movables, as 
opposed to the single levy on immovables (saisie-immobilière).18
13. Among  the  multitude  of  enforcement  procedures,  a  high  percentage 
results  in  monetary  enforcement.   Money claims  are  in  the  field  of 
garnishment.19  Under  French  law,  one  reason  for  the  popularity  of 
12 Law no. 91-650 on the reform of the civil enforcement of judgments, dated July 9, 1991 (thereafter the “Law of 
1991”), complemented by decree no 92-755 on new rules relating to civil enforcement for the implementation of  
“the Law of 1991,19” dated July 31, 1992 (thereafter the “Decree”). These entered into force on January 1, 
1993.
13 This institution was provided in France by the law no 72-626 instituting a Judge of Execution and on the 
reform of civil procedure, dated July 5, 1972, but it never became effective since the decree of application was 
never issued.
14 This is not the case for levy on immovable where the court authorization is still required.
15 Law of 1991, art. 22 §1.
16 “Garnishment” is called, in French, saisie-attribution, which, from the practical point of view, covers the more 
specific “garnishment of salaries” (saisie des rémunérations).  See generally N. Cayrol, Vis Saisie-Attribution, 
Juris-classeur Voies d’exécution, bundles no. 640, 641, and 642 (2008).
17 There is also the levy on corps (saisie des récoltes sur pied).
18 See generally  J. BELL, S. WHITTAKER, S. BOYRON, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW , Oxford University Press (1998), 
pp. 110-111.
19 Because garnishment is very popular, and for ease of discussion, this paper focuses only on this particular 
enforcement procedure.  Additional reasons can be found in the fact that levy on corporeal movable things is 
usually not  available when the debt is  below 535 € and garnishment  must  therefore  prevail  (art.  82 of the 




garnishment is the efficiency because of the immediate transfer of the 
garnished  claim  to  the  garnishor.20  It  allows  a  creditor  to  have  an 
enforceable  instrument  (titre  exécutoire)  and  where  substantive 
requirements  are  met  (including  the  certainty,  the  liquidity  and  the 
maturity  of  the  claim)  to  be  immediately  satisfied.   As soon as  the 
garnishment  summons  is  notified,  irrespective  of  the  actual  date  of 
payment by the garnishee. At this time, the receivable is removed from 
the debtor’s asset and immediately transferred to the creditor’s asset.
14. For  instance,  a  creditor  (garnishor  or  saisissant)  can  deliver 
garnishment to a bank (garnishee) holding the debtor (saisi)’s money.21 
The  delivery  process  of  the  garnishment  is  conducted  by  a  bailiff 
(huissier de justice) by means of a summons.22  Upon reception of the 
garnishment the bank (garnishee or tiers saisi) must give notice of the 
proceeding to the debtor within 8 days.23
15. Starting from the notice of garnishment given by the bank, the debtor 
can of course contest the garnishment before the Judge of Execution.24 
This action must be carried out within one month.25  Again, the debtor 
may  contest  the  amount  due  and/or  the  regularity  of  the  bailiff’s 
summons.  In many instances, there is no litigation, and the automatic 
transfer of ownership is independent of a judicial pronouncement.  The 
payment is delayed for only one month starting from the time of the 
notice of the garnishment to the debtor.26
subsequent garnishors or other levies (such as levy on corporeal movable things or  saisie-vente) can only be 
satisfied from the remaining part of the garnished claim, which has not been transferred.  This privilege of the 
first garnishor (privilège du premier saisissant) does not exist in levy on corporeal movable things (art. 43 §2 of 
the Law of 1991).
20 Art. 43 §1 of the Law of 1991.
21 The attachment of a bank account is the most frequent case of garnishment and is subject to the same rules.  In  
particular,  banks as  garnishees  are  generally bound, like any other  garnishee,  to  give  information as to the 
existence and the extent of the garnished claim notwithstanding the confidential character of the relationship 
between the bank and its client (Cass. com. May 6, 1981, D. 1982 p. 33, Gavalda; JCP 1982 II 19708, Vasseur).
22 Art. 46 of the Decree.
23 Art. 58 §1 of the Decree.
24 Art. 65 of the Decree.
25 Art. 66 of the Decree.




16. So, on one hand, you have a bankruptcy law which favors creditors but 
which  also  contains a provision – art. L. 632-2 paragraph 2 – that is 
detrimental  to  creditors  holding  a  garnishment  granted  during  the 
suspect period.  On the other hand, you have an enforcement procedure 
–  garnishment  –  that  gives  direct  and  immediate  ownership  on  the 
claim,  irrespective  of  any  subsequent  opening  of  bankruptcy 
proceedings.27
17. The  reason  for  this  conflict  is  that  bankruptcy  proceedings  adopt  a 
global policy of  the debtor’s  situation,  which does not just  take into 
consideration  individual  creditors.   Enforcement  law,  however,  is 
governed by a very individualistic  policy of creditors, where a special 
first-in-time rule (prix de la course) applies.  Now that we have covered 
the general background of Article L. 632-2, let’s turn to the foreground 
of our subject.
II FOREGROUND
18. The focal point is not the fact that this conflict might be solved in favor 
of one policy or the other, but is, rather, the conditions under which the 
solution is found.  There are two cumulative conditions under which 
garnishment can be invalidated; the first condition is chronological: the 
garnishment must be delivered by a creditor “after the date of cessation  
of payments.”  Logically one would try within one year from the court 
decision28 to advance the date of cessation of payments in order to get 
the garnishment invalidated.29
19. The second condition is much more difficult to meet.  The garnishment 
must  have been delivered  by a creditor  in knowledge of the date  of 
cessation  of  payments.   The  knowledge  of  the  date  of  cessation  of 
payments  is  equal  to  the  knowledge  of  the  cessation  of  payments 
27 Art.  43 §2 of the Law of  1991 provides,  in relevant  part,  that  “the subsequent  opening of  a bankruptcy  
proceeding leading to recovery  (redressement judiciaire)  or liquidation (liquidation judiciaire)  shall not affect  
such direct transfer.”
28 Art. L. 631-8 last § provides: “The petition for modifying this date must be filed with the court within a year  
after the court decision opening the proceeding.”
29 See L. Lauvergnat, L’annulation de la saisie-attribution pratiquée en période suspecte (A propos de l’alinéa 2  




itself.30  This is what I call a subjective condition.  While it is essential 
to define the exact meaning of the words “knowledge of the date of 
cessation of payments” (A), the analysis of this central point would not 
be complete if the relative consequences (B) were not discussed.
A Knowledge of the date of cessation of payments
20. The subjective condition related to “knowledge of the date of cessation 
of payments” is not unknown in French law.  Indeed, the first paragraph 
of Article L. 632-2, which existed prior to the Reform of 2005, contains 
a similar condition:
“payments for overdue debts made after the date of cessation of payments  
and acts for  consideration accomplished after such date shall be voidable if  
those  who  dealt  with  the  debtor  had  knowledge  of  the  cessation  of  
payments (emphasis added).”
21. The similitude in the drafting of paragraph two prompts looking at case 
law  construing  the  first  paragraph.   This  case  law  states  that  the 
knowledge of cessation of payments must be evidenced at the time the 
acts mentioned in the first paragraph were accomplished.31  In addition, 
case  law  seems  to  impose  a  rebuttable  presumption  on  professional 
creditors – such as banks – dealing with the debtor.32  The sole fact that 
banks  and debtors  maintain  usual  business  relations  implies  that  the 
bank knew of the cessation of payments.33  Professional assignments of 
debts have been invalidated because of the sole fact that the debtor’s 
bank account had a negative balance, which also implies that the bank 
knew about the cessation of payments.34
22. It  is  indeed  a  presumption  created  by  case  law,  the  bank  may  just 
“suspect”  the cessation  of  payments.   But,  the  suspicion  of,  and the 
actual knowledge of the cessation of payments, is two different things. 
30 For such a shortcut, although not explicitly mentioned, see Id. (no 7).
31 Cass. com. June 25, 1991, Bull. civ. IV, no 238.
32 Paris Court of Appeal, May 26, 1994, D. 1994 IR 207; Rev. proc. coll. 1995, p. 450, Lemistre.
33 Cass. com. May 11, 2003, Rev. proc. coll. no. 4, p. 386, G. Blanc.
34 Amiens Court of Appeal, Dec. 7, 2001, Rev. proc. coll. no. 4, p. 386, G. Blanc.  However, the rejection of a 
cheque and the notification of withdrawal of chequebook facilities do not show the knowledge of cessation of 




The risk is high that this reasoning carried out for paragraph one be 
transposed to paragraph two.
23. We can go even one step further: the mere fact that a garnishment is 
performed  may  lead  the  judge  to  presume  that  the  creditor  had 
knowledge of the cessation of payments.  Previous case law has already 
decided this way.35  Fortunately, the first published case law under new 
paragraph  two  of  Article  L.  632-2  does  not  seem  to  follow  this 
presumption.   The  French  city  of  Dijon  Court  of  Appeal  recently 
decided that the issuance by the Treasury - of a notice to a third party 
holding property (avis à tiers détenteur36) during the suspect period - 
was  not  sufficient  to  establish  the  Treasury’s  knowledge  of  the 
cessation of payments.  The fact that the debtor did not pay the VAT to 
the Treasury was not enough evidence to prove that the company was in 
cessation of payments.
24. Should the cessation of payments  be evidenced by additional  factors 
such as non-observance by the debtor of terms of payment granted by 
creditors?  An affirmative answer was given to this question by a lower 
court.37  But a few weeks ago, the Paris Court of Appeal condemned 
this approach and decided that a notice issued by the Treasury to a third 
party holding property does not explicitly prove the knowledge of the 
debtor’s cessation of payments. This decision was reached even if the 
Treasury knew, a few days before issuing the notice, that the debtor did 
not  observe  the  terms  of  payment  agreed  in  a  previous  rescue 
proceeding.38  This case law, relating to notices to a third party holding 
property,  can  undoubtedly  be  transposed  to  garnishment.39  In 
conclusion,  this  subjective  condition  should  not  be  interpreted  too 
35 Cass. com. May 19, 1958, Bull. civ. no 96; Cass. com. Feb. 2, 1965, Bull. civ. III no 87; see also Dijon Court 
of  Appeal,  Rev.  proc.  Coll.  1991-1,  p.  106,  no  10,  Y.  Guyon.   More  generally,  the  comments  of  Messrs 
M. Cabrillac & J. Argenson under Cass. com. Feb. 2, 1981, JCP 1981 ed. CI, no 9780.
36 See supra footnote no 5.
37 Commercial court of Bobigny, Oct. 25, 2006, D. 2007, no 4, p. 228, A. Lienhard; Gaz. Pal. 2007 somm. 1336, 
Roussel Galle.
38 Paris Court of Appeal, 3rd ch., Dec. 13, 2007, D. 2008, no 4, p. 221, A. Lienhard.
39 This was the case of an old case law where the old garnishment procedure (under the 1967 law) was involved 




broadly by the judges because the consequences attached thereof are 
decisive.
B Consequences
25. In French law, although the invalidation of the enforcement procedure 
will not be automatic when carried out during the suspect period, the 
following consequences of garnishment invalidation may be predicted: 
towards the creditor, and if the garnishment process is fully terminated 
(i.e. the automatic transfer of ownership, but also the payment to the 
garnishor), then the garnishor must return the funds.  Although the law 
does not explicitly specify this point, case law recently decided that the 
garnishor  must  return  the  funds  to  the  representative  creditor 
(mandataire judiciaire) and not to the garnishee.40
26. If the garnishment  process is  not fully terminated (i.e. the automatic 
transfer of ownership occurred, but not the payment to the garnishor), 
then  no  return  is  due  because  the  payment  was  not  made  by  the 
garnishee.  However, the ownership is already in the patrimony of the 
garnishor who loses the acquired right to be paid.
27. This new provision of French law may be questionable under article 6 
of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (“the  Convention”) 
which provides:
“In  the  determination  of  his  civil  rights  and  obligations…,  everyone  is  
entitled  to  a  fair  and  public  hearing  within  a  reasonable  time  by  an  
independent and impartial tribunal established by law…”




28. European  Court  case  law  clearly  confirms  that  enforcement  be 
protected by the Convention.41  Article 1 protocol 1 of the Convention, 
in relation to the protection of property,42 may be an additional basis for 
attacking article L. 632-2 §2.  But this is  another episode  for the  next 
Nagoya Symposium!
41 Enforcement procedure is part of the right to a fair and public hearing:  Hornsby v. Greece, March 19, 1997, 
§ 45, ECHR 1997.
42 Art. 1 of Protocol 1 provides, in §1: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his  
possessions.  No  one  shall  be  deprived  of  his  possessions  except  in  the  public  interest  and  subject  to  the  
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
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